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1Policy Brief
Nordic responses to Brexit: Making the 
best of a difficult situation
Björn Fägersten, Pétur Gunnarsson, Kristin Haugevik, Juha Jokela, Catharina Sørensen, 
Baldur Thorhallsson, and Anders Wivel
Three of these – Denmark, Finland and Sweden – are 
EU members, whereas Iceland and Norway are non-
members but part of the internal market through the 
EEA Agreement. We begin with a brief overview of the 
Nordic states’ approach to European integration and their 
relations with Britain historically, before turning to how 
Brexit has influenced these states’ internal debates about 
Europe and the EU since the referendum. Next, we discuss 
what changes may be expected in their approaches to 
EU policy-making post-Brexit, and the kinds of bilateral 
relationships the five have signalled that they will seek 
with Britain. We conclude with some reflections on how 
Brexit might influence dynamics among ‘the Nordic Five’ 
in the context of the EU.
The Nordics, Britain and the history of European 
integration
In the first decades after the Second World War, there were 
close and often explicit linkages between Britain’s and 
the Nordic states’ approach to the European integration 
process. Like Britain, the Nordic countries have been 
described as ‘reluctant integrationists’ or ‘footdraggers’ 
as regards political integration.2 Like Britain, the 
Nordic countries have typically approached European 
integration pragmatically, emphasizing the importance 
of tangible benefits rather than sweeping political visions 
for Europe.3 And like Britain, none of the Nordics became 
involved in the initial collaboration efforts that emerged 
in Europe the 1950s, collectively known as the European 
Communities (EC). Instead, having fairly similar positions 
as to how European integration could best be organized, 
Britain, Denmark, Norway and Sweden co-founded the 
alternative, more inter-governmentally oriented European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960. Finland became 
an associate member, in 1961, whereas Iceland was not 
involved in the initial EFTA negotiations – due mainly to 
fisheries disputes with Britain during this period.
Iceland joined EFTA in 1970, but the Nordic unity in EFTA 
did not last long. Already in 1961, Denmark and Norway 
had tagged along when Britain made a U-turn and applied 
for EC membership. In both Denmark and Norway, 
political and cultural ties to Britain were explicitly stated 
Summary
This policy brief examines how the British decision to 
withdraw from the EU has influenced the political debates 
in and foreign policies of the five Nordic states – Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. With the exception 
of Iceland, all these countries had a stated preference for 
Britain to remain in the EU – not least due to historical ties 
and the tendency of Britain and the Nordic countries to 
have similar approaches to European integration. Three 
general findings can be highlighted: First, Brexit has 
featured prominently in political debates in all the Nordic 
countries since the British referendum, and the causes and 
consequences of the Brexit vote continue to be discussed 
with vigour. In all the Nordic countries, Brexit has also 
stirred debates about their current relationships with 
the EU, prompting EU critics to demand new privileges or 
opt-outs. Overall, however, the Nordic governments, sup-
ported by a stable majority among their populations, have 
signalled that they wish to preserve their EU membership 
or current forms of association models, with the access 
and benefits these provide. Second, for all the Nordic coun-
tries, securing good relations with Britain post-Brexit is a 
key priority, but they have generally indicated that main-
taining good relations with the EU must come first. Finally, 
the Nordic governments are well aware that Brexit could 
create a vacuum in EU policy-making, perhaps tipping the 
balance among internal clusters. Britain has been a highly 
visible member of the ‘Northern’ grouping in the EU, and 
its absence is likely to be noticed. As the Nordic countries 
are about to lose what has at times been a powerful ally in 
EU decision-making, they may have to forge new coalitions 
to safeguard their interests.  
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This policy brief examines how the outcome of Britain’s 
June 2016 referendum, and the government’s subsequent 
decision to withdraw from the EU, has influenced the 
political debates in and foreign policy approaches of the 
five Nordic states.1
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as reasons for applying for membership. Also Iceland 
explored the EC possibility, but in the end, the government 
decided to let the matter rest due to its underdeveloped 
economy. For Finland and Sweden, EC membership was 
not a viable option at the time, as it was widely seen as 
being incompatible with their policies of non-alignment. 
Finland’s participation in West European economic 
integration was also limited because of reservations on 
the part of the neighbouring Soviet Union.
Britain’s entry into the EC was stopped twice by French 
vetoes, which meant that also the Danish and Norwegian 
applications were put on hold. When Britain was finally 
given the green light in the early 1970s, new debates about 
membership followed in both Denmark and Norway. In 
1973, following a referendum, Denmark followed Britain 
into the EEC. Norway, however, remained outside after an 
advisory referendum in which a narrow majority of voters 
(53.5%) advised against membership. 
With the exception of Denmark, EFTA remained the 
Nordic institutional home for two more decades. However, 
as the 1980s proceeded and the Cold War was drawing 
to an end, the remaining EFTA states,4 with Sweden in 
the lead, began seriously reconsidering membership in 
the internal market. Deliberations between the EC and 
EFTA states resulted in the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area (EEA), signed in 1994. The Agreement 
extended the single market to include also the EFTA 
states,5 and they in turn committed to ‘the four freedoms’ 
– unrestricted movement of goods, capital, services, and 
labour. However, at this point, the Swedish government 
had already signalled its intent to leave EFTA and 
become a full EU member. Strongly influenced by the 
Swedish decision, Finland and Norway also applied for 
membership. In 1995, both Finland and Sweden joined 
the EU, while Norway once again remained outside, 
following a second referendum. Iceland applied for EU 
membership for the first time in 2009, following the fiscal 
crisis. However, the negotiations were never completed, 
and have now been put on ice indefinitely.6
Opting out, opting in: European integration the 
Nordic way
While the most common combination among European 
states is to be a member of both the EU and NATO,7 only 
Denmark among the Nordic countries has chosen this 
model. The rest are either EU members (Sweden, Finland) 
or NATO members (Norway, Iceland).
Within the Nordic cluster, Finland has gone the farthest 
in terms of political integration: it is part of the Eurozone 
and has adopted the Euro as its currency (since 1999). 
Sweden has formally committed to doing the same, but 
has remained outside; in 2003, a majority of voters were 
opposed to Sweden’s entering the Eurozone. Denmark is 
the oldest Nordic EU member. Geographically, it is also 
the only ‘continental’ Nordic state, and the one positioned 
closest to Brussels. However, Denmark’s opt-outs from the 
Eurozone, and from matters under justice/home affairs 
and defence cooperation, have given it a reputation for 
being a ‘footdragger’ in Brussels and among more pro-EU 
countries. For Norway and Iceland, the EEA Agreement 
remains the chief institutional platform for their relations 
with the EU. However, unlike Denmark, they have often 
sought to opt in to other parts of European cooperation. 
For instance, both countries are party to the Schengen 
Agreement, and they tend to align themselves with the 
EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Nordic reactions to the Brexit vote
Historically, when Britain has changed or attempted 
to change the nature of its relationship with the EC 
or the EU, this has often also triggered debates in the 
Nordic countries about their membership or association 
models. This was also the case when it became clear that 
a small majority of British voters had voted in favour of 
‘Leave’ in the 2016 British referendum. In both the run-
up to and aftermath of the referendum, Brexit received 
considerable public attention in the Nordic countries 
– also in parliamentary debates, in media coverage and 
in academic analyses. Initially, much of the focus was 
on making sense of British decision, before shifting to 
possible scenarios and the implications for Britain, the 
EU and – increasingly – for the individual Nordic states 
themselves.
Apart from Iceland, whose government has observed 
that Brexit could represent an opportunity for Iceland 
and other non-EU North Atlantic states and entities (in 
terms of following the British lead and establishing free 
trade agreements with states around the world), the 
Nordic countries signalled that the result of the British 
referendum was not only unexpected, but also regrettable. 
While stressing that they respected the will of the British 
people, the general message from the Nordic capitals 
was that they would have preferred Britain to remain in 
the EU, and that they feared Brexit would have negative 
consequences not only for Britain, but for European 
integration as well. In the Nordic media, the British 
referendum has been widely portrayed as a turning point, 
an hour of destiny for European integration. 
In all the Nordic states, Brexit has triggered renewed 
debate about their current relationships with the EU. 
EU sceptics and critics have used the British decision to 
breathe new life into debates about national arrangements 
– what Fägersten has termed an EU debate ‘by proxy’.8 In 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, the debate has been about 
continued membership in a changing EU and, in the case 
of Denmark, current opt-outs possibilities. In Norway and 
Iceland, the spotlight has been on the pros and cons of the 
EEA Agreement. In Iceland, a group of parliamentarians 
has recently requested the Foreign Ministry prepare 
a report on the advantages and disadvantages of the 
Agreement. This move can be linked to more negative 
rhetoric on the EEA Agreement more generally. In all the 
Nordic countries, governments have generally wished to 
preserve their current formal relationships with the EU, 
with the access, benefits and opt-outs now in place. No 
one wishes to ‘rock the boat’. These default positions have 
support in the Nordic populations – current relationships 
with the EU enjoy wide backing. In the EU member states 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden, polls show growing 
popular support for continued membership.9 Conversely, 
in the non-member states Norway and Iceland, opposition 
to membership is increasing.10
Since the Brexit negotiations began, Denmark, Finland 
and Sweden have all remained loyal to the EU position, 
their governments taking care not to communicate 
deviating views concerning Britain’s exit deal. As EEA 
members, Iceland and Norway have been consulted 
underway, but they have no formal voice in the process. 
However, they too have remained loyal to the EU policy of 
not entering into bilateral talks with Britain about future 
deals, until the withdrawal terms, transition period and 
future association model have been agreed upon.
3EU minus Britain: What implications for the Nordics?
When Britain leaves EU membership behind, and joins 
the group of EU outsiders in Europe, this will have 
implications for the remaining members, for other third 
countries, and for the dynamics between these two 
groups. Starting with the EU’s internal dynamics, Britain’s 
exit seems likely to alter the balance of power among the 
remaining 27 member states. Since Britain joined the EC 
in 1973, the Nordic states – members and non-members – 
have often identified with British positions within the EC/
EU, seeing Britain as an important and ‘likeminded’ voice 
on many matters of European integration.11 Also in non-
member Norway, governments since the Brexit vote have 
emphasized how Britain inside the EU has given voice to 
viewpoints harmonizing with those of Norway.12 Britain 
and the three Nordic NATO members Denmark, Iceland 
and Norway have had similar ‘anti-federalist’ leanings, 
coupled with a preference for Atlanticism and a continued 
strong US presence in European security. Britain and 
the Nordic countries also share a general preference for 
liberal trade policies. Further, Britain and the Nordics 
share an identity as pragmatic Europeans, effective in 
implementing EU directives once these have been agreed 
on.13
When Britain leaves the EU, the cluster of Northern 
European states known for often voting together are set 
to ‘lose about 12 percent of their voting power’.14 Brexit 
could therefore trigger new coalition and voting patterns 
within the EU. Concerning the EU agenda, as Britain’s 
departure date draws closer, the Nordic EU members as 
well as Norway have increasingly shifted their attention 
towards other like-minded EU members. Germany has 
been an important interlocutor for some time, and a 
further strengthening of this relationship now seems 
underway. In March 2018, the finance ministers of eight 
northern EU member states published a joint paper 
on euro-area reform. The paper reflected their known 
opposition to proposals calling for a deeper fiscal union, 
underlining instead market discipline and national 
responsibility. The inclusion of non-euro members such 
as Denmark and Sweden in this joint paper indicates that 
the interests of the non-euro members count in the North. 
This move might also speak to a more general concern 
related to the relative power of the middle-sized and small 
northern members in a post-Brexit EU.15
The ‘Norway model’ has been a key reference point in the 
Brexit debate since David Cameron held his Bloomberg 
speech back in 2013, when he took the first step towards 
realizing the plans for a British in/out referendum. While the 
governments of both Cameron and May have consistently 
ruled out the Norwegian model – i.e. joining the EEA from 
the EFTA side – British officials, journalists and scholars 
have taken considerable interest in Norway’s experiences 
as a non-member. While evidently flattered by the interest, 
members of the Norwegian government have expressed 
some concern at this possible outcome, not least since a 
British return to EFTA would radically alter the internal 
dynamics among today’s EFTA states.16 By contrast, two 
consecutive Icelandic foreign ministers have welcomed 
Britain back into EFTA. The current foreign minister has 
welcomed the idea of Britain becoming a champion of free 
trade post-Brexit. In the foreign ministries of both Iceland 
and Norway, cross-departmental Brexit teams have been 
established, to identify the potential legal, economic and 
political implications for non-member states.
The British exit and transition deal, and Britain’s entry 
into the outsider group, may serve to tilt the European 
integration process towards greater differentiation, for 
instance by opening further possibilities for opting in or 
out of specific areas of cooperation. In turn, the distinction 
between outsiders and insiders could become blurrier 
than it is today. However, also the converse is possible: 
that the distinctions between insiders and outsiders 
become further sharpened, forcing countries like the 
Nordics to choose whether they want to be on board fully 
(e.g. on the euro, on defence cooperation) or to position 
themselves in the outer tier of a multi-speed Europe.
Britain minus the EU: What implications for the 
Nordics?
All the Nordic states have enjoyed close historical ties 
with Britain; however, Britain has played different roles in 
their foreign policies. For Denmark and Norway, relations 
with Britain have been particularly important in the field 
of security and defence and in NATO,17 and that seems 
likely to continue after Brexit. However, Denmark will 
lose its most important ‘intergovernmentalist’ ally in the 
EU and one of its closest trading partners. For Sweden 
and Finland, Britain has been particularly important as 
a trading partner and, on the bilateral level, as a security 
partner. All these countries thus have expressed strong 
interest in maintaining good bilateral relations with 
Britain post-Brexit, although they have also signalled that 
relations with the EU will have priority, should a conflict 
arise between the two concerns.
Iceland, which is also heavily reliant on exports to Britain, 
is probably the Nordic state with the most conflicting 
relationship with Britain: it has been described as ‘close, 
but full of challenges’. The cod wars from the late 1950s 
to the 1970s are an obvious case in point, likewise the 
diplomatic crisis (the Icesave dispute) that followed the 
bank collapse in 2008, when British citizens lost their 
savings in Icelandic banks and the Brown government 
made use of terrorism laws to freeze assets. Nevertheless, 
these challenges have not hindered the Icelandic 
government in seeking to establish closer ties with Britain 
after the Brexit referendum.  
Concluding remarks
The British government’s decision to withdraw from the 
EU, after 45 years as a member state, marks a watershed 
in the history of European integration. Along with 
increased uncertainty about US foreign policy, Brexit 
strikes at the very foundations of trans-Atlantic security 
and economic relations, of which the United States and 
Britain have traditionally been the key guardians. While 
the outcome of the Brexit negotiations and their states. 
For the Nordic countries, which have long considered 
themselves Northern European allies of Britain, Brexit 
could change the way they operate within or in relation 
to the EU. One possible result could be a further increase 
in informal Northern European cooperation initiatives, 
outside the EU and with Britain on the team. Or Britain 
might shift to playing a more peripheral role in the foreign 
policy of the Nordic states, and the Northern dimension 
in the EU could either be watered out or change its form – 
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